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We must confront the recent surveillance abuses to develop
better policy moving forward
President Obama’s speech on surveillance has been criticized for being heavy on rhetoric and
light on true reforms, essentially opting to keep the current system fundamentally intact with some
additional oversight. Frank Pasquale examines one of the more concerning, but largely ignored
abuses of the gathered intelligence—the sharing of national security data across bureaus for law
enforcement purposes. He argues that before better surveillance policy can be developed there
must be a commission to review the politicization of intelligence gathering.
In his recent speech on surveillance, President Obama treated the misuse of intelligence
gathering as a relic of American history. It was something done in the bad old days of J. Edgar Hoover, and never
countenanced by recent administrations. But the accumulation of menacing stories—from fusion centers to “joint
terrorism task forces” to a New York “demographics unit” targeting Muslims—is impossible to ignore. The
American Civil Liberties Union has now collected instances of police surveillance and obstruction of First
Amendment‐protected activity in over half the states. From Alaska (where military intelligence spied on an anti-
war group) to Florida (where Quakers and anti-globalization activists were put on watchlists), protesters have
been considered threats, rather than citizens exercising core constitutional rights. Political dissent is a routine
target for surveillance by the FBI.
Admittedly, I am unaware of the
NSA itself engaging in politically
driven spying on American
citizens. Charles Krauthammer
says there has not been a “single
case” of abuse. But the NSA is
only one part of the larger story
of intelligence gathering in the
US, which involves over 1,000
agencies and nearly 2,000
private companies. Moreover, we
have little idea of exactly how
information and requests flow
between agencies. Consider the
Orwellian practice of “parallel
construction.” Reuters has
reported that the NSA gave “tips”
to the Special Operations
Division (SOD) of the Drug
Enforcement Administration,
which also shared them with the
Internal Revenue Service.
The legal status of such information sharing is murky at best: the national security data is not supposed to be used
for law enforcement purposes. Apparently the SOD sidestepped these niceties by re-creating criminal
investigations from scratch, fabricating alternative grounds for suspecting the targets. Thus the “parallel
construction” of two realities for the law enforcers: one actual, secret record of how targets were selected, and
another specially crafted for consumption by courts. Two senior Drug Enforcement Administration officials
defended the program and called it legal, but did not disclose their reasoning. At present, the practice looks like
little more than intelligence laundering. Five senators asked the Department of Justice to assess the legality of
“parallel construction;” it has yet to respond.
I have little doubt that the DEA used parallel construction in cases involving some pretty nasty characters. It must
be tempting to apply “war on terror” tactics to the “war on drugs.” Nevertheless, there are serious legal and ethical
concerns here. One of the American revolutionaries’ chief complaints against the British Crown was the
indiscriminate use of “general warrants,” which allowed authorities to search the homes of anyone without
particularized suspicion they had committed a crime. Thus the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution decrees
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Law enforcers aren’t supposed to set up “dragnet
surveillance” of every communication, or use whatever data stores are compiled by the National Security Agency,
unless there is a true security threat.
Between 1956 and 1971, the FBI’s COINTELPRO program engaged in domestic covert action designed to
disrupt groups engaged in the civil rights, antiwar, and communist movements. As Lawrence Rosenthal has
observed, “History reflects a serious risk of abuse in investigations based on the protected speech of the targets,”
and politicians at the time responded. Reviewing intelligence agency abuses from that time period, the Church
Committee issued a series of damning reports in 1975-76, leading to some basic reforms. If a new Church
Committee were convened, it would have to cover much of the same ground. Moreover, it would need to put in
place real safeguards against politicized (or laundered) domestic intelligence gathering. Those are presently
lacking. I have yet to find a case where the parties involved in any of the intelligence politicization (or laundering)
were seriously punished. Nor have I seen evidence that the victims of such incidents have received just
compensation for the unwarranted intrusion on their affairs.
Before we can develop better surveillance policy, we need something like a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
to review (and rebuke) the politicization of intelligence gathering post-9/11. Too many privacy activists have been
unwilling to admit the persistence of catastrophic threats that may only be detected by spies. But the US
government has been even less moored to reality, unwilling to admit that a runaway surveillance state has
engaged in precisely the types of activities that the Bill of Rights is designed to prevent. To have a debate about
the proper balance between liberty and security, we need to confront the many cases where misguided
intelligence personnel spied on activists with neither goal in mind.
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